



**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
BEAUMONT DIVISION**

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**§**

**v.**

**§ CASE NO. 1:07-CR-126**

**KENNETH WAYNON HOOKER**

**§**

**FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLEA OF TRUE  
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and the Local Rules for the District Court, Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter for hearing and the submission of findings of fact and a report and recommendation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(i) and 3583(e). The United States alleges that Defendant, Kenneth Waynon Hooker, violated conditions of supervised release imposed by United States District Judge Marcia A. Crone. The United States Probation Office filed its *Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under Supervision* (doc. #49) requesting the revocation of the defendant's supervised release

The Court conducted a hearing on June 4, 2014, in accordance with Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 11, 32 and 32.1. Defendant was present and represented by counsel at the hearing. Having heard the evidence, this court factually finds that the defendant has violated conditions of supervision and recommends that such violation warrants the revocation of his

supervised release.

After conducting the proceeding in the form and manner prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the Court finds:

a. That Defendant, after consultation with counsel of record, has knowingly, freely and voluntarily consented to the administration of the plea of true in this cause by a United States Magistrate Judge subject to a final approval and imposition of sentence by the District Court.

b. That Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea, that Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, that his plea of true is a knowing and voluntary plea, not the result of force or threats, and that the plea is supported by an independent evidentiary basis in fact establishing each of the essential elements of the conduct.

#### **STATEMENT OF REASONS**

##### **A. Procedural History**

On March 18, 2008, the Honorable Marcia A. Crone of the Eastern District of Texas sentenced the defendant after he pled guilty to the offense of theft of firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer, a Class C felony. The Court sentenced the defendant to 80 months imprisonment, followed by 3 years supervised release, subject to the standard conditions of release, plus special conditions to include financial disclosure, drug treatment and a \$100 special assessment. On April 18, 2013, Kenneth Waynon Hooker completed his period of imprisonment and began service of the supervision term.

On April 19, 2014, the Court modified Mr. Hooker's conditions of supervision to include residing in a community corrections center for 180 days. On May 8, 2014, the Court modified his

conditions again to include inpatient drug treatment.

**B. Allegations in Petition**

The United States alleges that the defendant violated the following mandatory condition of supervised release:

*The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime.*

On April 28, 2014, Mr. Hooker was arrested by Lumberton Police Department, Hardin County, Texas, for Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. He remained in Hardin County Jail and was given time served.

**C. Evidence presented at Hearing**

At the hearing, the Government offered the following evidence as its factual basis in support of the alleged violation. The Government submitted, in exhibit form, a copy of the incident report from Mr. Hooker's arrest on April 28, 2014. It also proffered evidence establishing that Mr. Hooker was finally convicted of that offense in Hardin County and given credit for time served in the Hardin County Jail.

Defendant, Kenneth Waynon Hooker, offered a plea of true to the above-stated allegation in the petition. Specifically, he agreed with the evidence presented and pled true to the allegation that he committed a new state crime in violation of his supervision conditions in this case.

**D. Sentencing Guidelines; Findings and Recommended Disposition**

The allegations, supporting evidence and plea of true warrant revocation of supervised release. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The Court factually finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a mandatory condition of his supervised release by committing a new state crime.

If the Court finds that Mr. Hooker violated his supervision conditions in the manner stated above, this will constitute a Grade C violation under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a). Upon finding a Grade C violation, the Court may revoke the defendant's supervised release. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2). Based upon the defendant's criminal history category of VI and the Grade C violation, the Sentencing Guidelines suggest a sentence of imprisonment for a period ranging from 8 to 14 months. *See* U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because the original offense of conviction was a Class C felony, the statutory maximum imprisonment term upon revocation is two years. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

The Fifth Circuit states that Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines regarding the revocation of supervised release is advisory only. *See United States v. Cade*, 279 F.3d 265, 271 n.2 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002) (citing *United States v. Montez*, 952 F.2d 854, 859 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992); *United States v. Headrick*, 963 F.2d 777, 782 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992)). Because Chapter 7 was promulgated as an advisory policy statement and there are no applicable guidelines for sentencing after revocation of supervised release<sup>1</sup>, the Court may impose a greater or lesser sentence upon revocation. *United States v. Gonzalez*, 250 F.3d 923, 925 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2001). Further, a sentence imposed for revocation will be upheld unless it is in violation of the law or plainly unreasonable. *Id. See also United States v. Pena*, 125 F.3d 285, 288 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

Here, the evidence and the defendant's own admission supports a finding that he violated his supervision conditions. The Court, therefore, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed a Grade C violation of his supervision conditions by being convicted of a state

---

<sup>1</sup> *See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*, Ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 1 ("At this time, the Commission has chosen to promulgate policy statements only.")

crime. The defendant knowingly and voluntarily pled true to this conduct and agreed with the recommended sentence.


Therefore, based upon the plea of true, the evidence presented in this case, and the parties' agreement, the undersigned magistrate judge recommends that the District Court accept the plea of true and revoke Defendant's supervised release. The undersigned magistrate judge further recommends that the District Court order Defendant, Kenneth Waynon Hooker, to serve a term of **twelve (12) months and one (1) day imprisonment** in this cause, with no additional supervised release to follow. Finally, the Court recommends that the defendant be placed in the Beaumont Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) for service of the prison term, if possible, to allow for family visitation.

### OBJECTIONS

Objections must be: (1) specific, (2) in writing, and (3) served and filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report. *See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).* A party's failure to object bars that party from: (1) entitlement to *de novo* review by a district judge of proposed findings and recommendations, *see Rodriguez v. Bowen*, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988), and (2) appellate review, except on grounds of plain error of unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, *see Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass 'n.*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996) (en banc). The constitutional safeguards afforded by Congress and the courts require that, when a party takes advantage of his right to object to a magistrate's findings or recommendation, a district judge must exercise its nondelegable authority by considering the actual evidence and not merely by reviewing and blindly adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. *See Hernandez v. Estelle*, 711 F.2d 619, 620 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1983); *United States v.*

*Elsoffer*, 644 F.2d 357, 359 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

**SIGNED this the 5th day of June, 2014.**



KEITH F. GIBLIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE